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Abstract: 
Linguistic creativity is the ability to understand indefinitely many previously unencountered sentences. In 
this paper, I compare Chomsky’s and Ricœur’s contrasting conceptions of this ability, in particular, their 
divergent views of nonsense. With nonsense, it seems as if syntax is outrunning semantics. Chomsky took 
this to show that syntax is autonomous of semantics. I propose a reading of Ricœur’s work on metaphor 
whereby Chomsky’s thesis is modified so that syntax and semantics are declared to be ultimately co-
extensive notions. 
Keywords: Linguistic Creativity, Imagination, and Metaphor. 
Résumé: 
La créativité langagière est la capacité de comprendre indéfiniment beaucoup de phrases que nous n’avons 
pas rencontrées au préalable. Dans cet article, je compare les approches contrastées de cette capacité que 
proposent Chomsky et Ricœur, en insistant en particulier sur leurs conceptions divergentes du non-sens. 
Avec le non-sens, il semble que la syntaxe dépasse la sémantique. Chomsky s’en empare pour montrer que 
la syntaxe est autonome par rapport à la sémantique. Je propose une lecture de l’œuvre de Ricœur sur la 
métaphore qui me conduit à modifier la thèse de Chomsky en montrant que la syntaxe et la sémantique sont 
à titre ultime des notions coextensives. 
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1. Introduction 
Let me start with an important quote by Paul Ricœur: 
Our images are spoken before they are seen.1 
At first blush, this rather startling remark might seem to be either a metaphorical flourish 
or a category mistake that pairs incompatible sensorial modes while also reversing the natural 
order of things. Surely, the obvious complaint would go, Ricœur is getting things back to front 
here, for images must be seen before they can be spoken. In any case, how could images be 
“spoken”? What could that possibly mean? This reaction undoubtedly has initial plausibility. In 
this paper, however, I want to defend the implausible, literal reading. I want to take Ricœur at his 
word. I want to claim that the quote wears its content right on its sleeve. Truly, images first 
appear to us in language, and only later in vision. We think otherwise because, as Ricœur would 
say, we tend to confuse productive and reproductive imagination, because we ignore the 
constitutive role of images as the privileged source of new ways of seeing, and instead take 
imagination to be wholly parasitic on previous sensorial impressions. Against that confusion, I 
shall argue, again following Ricœur, that productive imagination has epistemological and 
metaphysical priority over reproductive imagination. More specifically, I shall interpret Ricœur’s 
claim as saying that productive imagination has its origin in syntax, that syntax is the proper 
home of spoken images. To anticipate, a spoken image presents to us a novel seeing-as, a novel 
way of seeing a thing as a thing of a certain sort, a way of bringing a thing under a specific, but 
still to be determined concept. Syntax is the home of speaking images because it is syntax that 
first gives hospitality to concepts, to what makes seeing-as possible.2 To say that images are first 
spoken is thus to say that syntax presents fresh concepts to us in the form of verbal images before 
we have made our own the new ways of seeing determined by those concepts, before we have 
mastered, or indeed understood, the conditions of applicability attached to the concepts 
expressed by the novel combination of words that make up a verbal image. On the reading I 
propose, then, Ricœur holds that syntax already deploys concepts before we can grasp them, with 
semantics catching up only later. In the beginning was the word as pure syntax. Meaning always 
arrives second, for to speak, or to hear, is not yet to see-as. 
I shall next argue that the reading I propose brings the full force of Ricœur’s radical 
conception of linguistic creativity into view, a conception inextricably connected to his views 
about imaginative creativity, that is, productive imagination. Crucially, I shall attribute to Ricœur 
a priority of syntax thesis cashed out as a bolder version of the autonomy of syntax thesis made 
famous by Chomsky. Its boldness is due to the fact that, unlike Chomsky, Ricœur allows syntax 
to expand the boundaries of conceptual space. Whereas for Chomsky novel combinations of 
syntactic strings may give rise to nonsense, thus marking the points at which semantics, and our 
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concepts, give out, for Ricœur syntax pushes the boundaries of meaningfulness further and 
further out, but it never quite outruns semantics. The temporary gaps between syntax and 
semantics are filled in and made good by la métaphore vive, a phenomenon triggered by the 
spoken image. It is metaphor’s ability to make sense out of nonsense through the redrawing of 
extant conceptual-semantic fields that secures new spaces for semantics by making the spoken 
images visible to us. In short, semantics catches up with syntax on the back of metaphor. The 
overall picture that I propose, then, is that the spoken image, as presented by syntax, is the 
precursor to metaphor. In turn, metaphor is the instrument whereby the possibilities first 
mapped out by syntax are incorporated into the semantics, that is, into the range of ways of 
seeing-as directly available to speakers. 
The plan for the paper is as follows. After a brief discussion of Chomsky’s conception of 
linguistic creativity in § 2, I shall devote § 3 to mustering some textual evidence that I think 
supports the attribution of the priority of syntax thesis to Ricœur. In § 4, I shall raise a problem 
for Ricœur, an antimony that is triggered by the very radicalness of his conception of linguistic 
creativity. I shall argue that Ricœur’s distinctive view of metaphor gives rise to paradox, since it 
entails that metaphor cannot but live between languages, that while metaphor broaches fresh 
paths through the space of meaningfulness, it does not and cannot itself inhabit any location 
within that space. If so, it then becomes unclear how metaphor could engender new meanings 
from within a language by means of a clash between the existing semantic categories of that 
language, as Ricœur claims that it does. In § 5, I propose a solution whereby we take metaphor to 
temporarily suspend the particularised referential powers of language, while leaving intact the 
general, non-context-specific features of those powers. The upshot is that the space of 
meaningfulness inhabited by metaphor is supra-linguistic and maximally reflective in an 
appropriately Ricœurian fashion. Metaphor, then, momentarily takes us outside language, so as 
to expand it further from a privileged meaning-determining “pictorial level.”3 
2. Chomsky and the Autonomy of Syntax Thesis 
It is standardly taken to be a constitutive fact about language that even moderately 
competent speakers are endowed with unbound powers of linguistic creativity, that they can, 
more or less immediately, understand and produce an indefinite number of novel sentences, 
sentences that they have never heard or produced before.4 Naturally enough, we expect an 
empirically adequate linguistic theory to explain how this is possible—the range of sentences we 
can effortlessly understand is infinite and we are, after all, finite beings.5 The explanatory 
problem is pressing, and indeed, according to Chomsky, accounting for “the creative aspect of 
language use” is “[t]he primary question for linguistic theory.”6 The standard answer to the 
puzzle is that we are in a position to work out the meaning of previously unencountered 
sentences in virtue of our (tacit) knowledge of the lexical axioms (the axioms fixing the meaning 
for the items in the lexicon) and of the rules for the syntactic combination of those items. A little 
more formally, the standard answer is that linguistic understanding is closed under the 
compositional operations that generate the meanings of sentences from those of their 
constituents, i.e., that those operations never take us beyond what we can understand.7 
Walter B. Pedriali 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 8, No 1 (2017)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2017.370    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu   
85 
 
This picture of linguistic creativity is attractive and it accords well with our pre-
theoretical intuitions. Chomksy, however, noted a fly in the ointment.8 There are sentences that, 
while grammatically well-formed, are opaque to our understanding, sentences such that the 
syntax seems to outrun the semantics.9 If so, linguistic understanding is not closed under 
composition, since syntax may at times take us outside the space of meaningfulness. To make the 
issue vivid, Chomsky gave a now famous instance of this phenomenon: 
(CS) Colourless green ideas sleep furiously.10 
CS is syntactically grammatical. It is however a particularly extreme case of semantic 
deviancy, since none of the successive pairings of its constituent words are deemed to be 
semantically acceptable (if something is green it is not colourless, ideas cannot be green, nor can 
they sleep, and so on). Although our judgment is that the internal syntactic arrangement of the 
sentence is unimpeachable, we just cannot make any sense of the meaning CS expresses. For 
Chomsky, this neatly highlights another characteristic aspect of our linguistic creativity: 
Normal mastery of a language involves not only the ability to understand immediately an 
indefinite number of entirely new sentences, but also the ability to identify deviant 
sentences and, on occasion, to impose an interpretation on them. 
Crucially, he also added: 
The distinction [between normal and deviant sentences] can clearly be both stated and 
motivated on syntactic grounds.11 
Presently, I shall take issue with this further claim. For now, let me note that in the case 
of CS the deviancy is so severe that the sentence appears strongly impervious to interpretation:12 
Any speaker of English will recognize at once that [CS] is an absurd English sentence.13 
Chomsky used CS as part of his master argument for the autonomy of syntax thesis, the 
thesis whereby the language faculty is said to be autonomous of other faculties in the mind and 
able to generate “abstract structures” independent of and prior to semantics.14 One immediate 
consequence of the thesis is that the class of semantically well-formed strings is a proper part of 
the class of syntactically well-formed strings.15 Chomsky is aware that an empirically adequate 
linguistic theory must predict which syntactically well-formed strings will not be assigned a 
meaning by the semantics, that it must explain why and how our syntactic creativity exceeds our 
semantic creativity.16 The story that Chomsky tells to explain the failure of semantic closure is 
that the deviancy of CS can (and must) be explained in terms of the violation of selectional 
restrictions (a subclass of the subcategorization rules that determine which kind of arguments 
verbs can take, which adjectives may modify which nouns).17 Lexical items, that is, are said to 
come with syntactic features that select arguments on the basis of these features. And so, e.g. 
‘sleep’ will come with an ANIMATE feature marked positive and therefore will only take subjects 
that are themselves marked positive for that feature (sentences which violate this restriction will 
not be passed on to the semantics module). 
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Chomsky’s main claim, then, is that syntax can control subcategorization principles in 
abstraction from semantics, that the compositional operations are primed by the syntactic ones. I 
think the claim, as formulated by Chomsky, is false. There is however a true, and, as I said, 
bolder claim in the vicinity that I shall unpack in § 5. The task for the rest of this section is to 
substantiate the charge that syntax is not autonomous in Chomsky’s sense. 
I’ll start by examining Chomsky’s own response to CS. His explanation of the syntactic 
grammaticality of CS is that “ideal listeners” will try to assign an interpretation to it “on the basis 
of analogy to nondeviant cases.”18 Chomsky helpfully provides an instance of what he takes to be 
a nondeviant sentence of “normal English” that analogically guides speakers as they attempt to 
make sense of CS: 
(1) Revolutionary new ideas appear infrequently.19 
Chomsky’s claim, however, is rather puzzling. (1) may be a “normal” — better: a 
normalized — sentence of English as of 1955. But in fact, it is a sentence that, by Chomsky’s own 
lights, violates several obvious categorial restrictions. For a start, ‘revolutionary’, strictly 
speaking, means the opposite of what it is commonly taken to mean. It indicates a regular, utterly 
predictable trajectory along a fixed orbit; it does not mean, in its original astronomical meaning, 
groundbreaking, epoch-making, norm-deviating and so forth. These are derived meanings 
acquired at a later stage in the natural history of that word, a history for which Chomsky shows 
scant interest, if any at all.20 An even cursory look at that history will reveal that the term 
‘revolution’ was first introduced in the 14th century solely to denote a property of the motion of 
celestial bodies. Its applicability was then extended to political upheavals in the mid-
15th century. Only much later did it apply to abstract terms such as ideas.21 And the same, 
mutatis mutandis, is true of ‘appear’. Abstract notions such as ideas are by definition not part of 
the phenomenal realm, they do not belong to the realm of that which appears in our experience.22 
In other words, (1) is, at a minimum, a heavily metaphorical sentence. But in fact, it is highly 
plausible that it would have been classed as highly deviant and even outright nonsensical back 
in, say, 1355. 
If this is right, it is unclear that the claim that it is syntax—rather than current usage—
that fixes what counts as a legitimate meaning-combination is justified. In particular, it is unclear 
that purely “syntactic grounds” can force the stipulation that while ‘appear’ can take ‘ideas’ as 
subject, ‘sleep’ cannot. If the reply is that only things falling under the category ANIMATE can 
sleep, a moment’s reflection will show that that category is largely a non-invariant artefact of 
one’s conceptual scheme, demonstrably subject to historical change, and obviously impossible to 
ground in “hard-wired” structures in our mind, as exemplified in syntax. It also seems that these 
considerations, if sound, will readily generalise across the entire language. 
The lesson, it seems to me, is that we need a different story about the relation between 
syntax, semantics and conceptual structure than the one told by Chomsky. On his view, language 
learners absorb conceptual strictures, as encased in the syntax, far too quickly for those strictures 
to be acquired through experience.23 Chomsky therefore takes our linguistic competence to be 
informed and guided “by a rich and invariant conceptual system, which is prior to any 
experience,” a system that, Chomsky argues, has been handed out to us “from the original hand 
of nature.”24 Chomsky’s argument, however, moves far too quickly from the premise that 
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concepts are something that we “possess and use without thought or awareness” to the 
conclusion that immediacy of use rules out the possibility that concepts might be historically 
inflected.25 Given that immediacy, Chomsky concludes that the conceptual framework is “a 
common human property,”26 without taking note of the fact that the contrast, as of 1955, between 
the apparent immediacy of e.g. ‘revolutionary ideas’ and the perceived deviancy of ‘green ideas’ 
is itself a historically determined feature. And because it is so determined, it follows that 1955-
immediacy cannot play the justificatory role that Chomsky needs for his absolutist, hand-of-
nature claim to go through and for his claim that purely syntactic grounds can explain the 
phenomenon of grammatical nonsense. 
If my discussion has been along the right lines, Chomsky’s conception of nonsense is not 
wholly on target. Chomsky is surely right that syntax carves up a path that semantics must 
follow.27 But syntactic categories are not set by the hand of nature. Above all, syntactic categories 
do not provide a comfortable home for our linguistic competence, a home where sentences come 
with interpretations pre-packed into them. On the contrary, the correct view of the issue, as I 
shall propose later, is that syntactic categories ceaselessly challenge us towards new conceptual 
structures, new semantic fields, towards new ways of understanding, towards new ways of being 
in the world, new ways of thinking of objects. As it happens, this contrasting conception of 
syntactic categories is, I think, the one properly attributable to Ricœur. Let me now turn to his 
view of linguistic creativity, a view that, I think, gets us much closer to the heart of the matter. 
3. The Many Languages of Ricœur 
To properly frame what I have called Ricœur’s priority of syntax thesis, it will be helpful 
to start by reviewing some of the key features of his conception of language. First, Ricœur draws 
a sharp distinction between language qua discourse (L-discourse) and language qua system (L-
system), between language qua eventuated, actualised discourse, language as interpreted text, 
and language as a formal object abstracted from use.28 In sharp contrast to Chomsky, Ricœur 
assigns ontological priority to L-discourse.29 Only discourse is real; language qua system is 
virtual, derivative, and secondary. Languages are therefore individuated in terms of (classes of) 
meaning-events and not in terms of (classes of) abstract encodings. Languages are eventuated in 
time, whereas systems reside outside of time and hence have no genuine claim to existence. 
To master a language, on this view, is to master L-discourse rather than L-system—since 
one can only master what exists. Furthermore, to master L-discourse is to understand it; and to 
understand L-discourse is to be able to understand a text within that discourse, it is to 
understand the content of that text, a content that however goes beyond traditional conceptions 
of meaning: 
[T]he reference of the text [...] is the kind of world opened up by the deep semantics of the 
text. [...] What has to be understood [...] is what points towards a possible world, [...] the 
world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text. [...] The text speaks of a 
possible world and of a possible way of orientating oneself within it. The dimensions of 
this world are properly opened up by and disclosed by the text.30 
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For Ricœur, then, meanings are not inert contents; they are, rather, world-disclosing, 
action-guiding contents, in that they make available ways of being in the world.31 Accordingly, to 
be masters of a language is to understand (and to make one’s own) a way of being in the world. It 
is thus precisely to the extent that L-discourse has ontological priority over L-system that the 
world-disclosing properties of expressions have metaphysical precedence over their syntactico-
semantic properties—although the latter properties have epistemological priority since they 
provide access to the former. It follows, and this will play an important part in our discussion in 
§ 5, that the representational-referential properties of language can at most be temporarily 
suspended, since it is in virtue of mastering those properties that one also acquires a way of being 
in the world.32 If those properties were wholly suspended, language would cease to be language. 
It also follows that the primary function of language is, rather than mere communication, that of 
making us what we are, since language, in disclosing a world, thereby discloses and determines 
the interpreter of that world, that is, the speaking self.33 
Accordingly, and again in contrast to Chomsky, on Ricœur’s account we have an 
immediate and satisfying explanation of why speakers do not have to interpret non-deviant 
sentences. Speakers experience no such need because they “feel at home” there (as Wittgenstein 
aptly put it),34 because speakers are at ease in the language to which those sentences belong, in 
the house of the specific modes of being that the language determines and that they, qua speakers, 
inhabit. They recognise themselves in those ways of being in the world. And they have no need 
to interpret the sentences in their habitual L-discourse, because they have already self-interpreted 
themselves as the speakers (and readers) of those texts. Conversely, from Ricœur’s perspective 
the problem raised by the Chomsky sentence is that speakers are unable to grasp what kind of 
being would have a use for that sentence. Learning a language is thus primarily a question of 
finding out, who we are through finding out which language we actually speak. We do so by 
learning ways of seeing the world, ways of seeing-as, since to be the particular self one is, is to 
see-as in a particular way. As it happens, the two key notions in this process of language-mastery 
are those of spoken images and of metaphor. In the next two sub-sections, I say a little more 
about each notion. 
3.1. From Speaking Images to Metaphor 
As anticipated in the introduction, spoken images are verbal images, or, as Ricœur calls 
them, bound images, linguistically controlled images, images that originate from and are grounded 
in language.35 The notion of spoken image plays two main roles in Ricœur’s conception. First, it 
vindicates the primacy of the productive, non-derivative side of imagination.36 Secondly, it 
grounds productive imagination in the productive aspects of language. One quote for all: 
There is no function of imagination [...] that is not said or about-to-be said in language [...] 
Imagination never resides in the unsaid.37 
The spoken image, then, is an image that is spoken but not yet said, because a successful 
saying also requires what Austin called uptake.38 In the absence of uptake, by either speaker or 
hearer, the spoken image remains an image that is only about to be said. Otherwise put, a 
successful saying requires that the image be grasped in propositional terms, as a seeing-as that 
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brings an object under a recognized concept.39 To say, and to recognize what is said, is therefore 
a question of communicating (respectively, grasping) a specific mode of seeing-as. 
Though unsaid, a spoken image however remains at all times language-bound. 
Imaginative and linguistic productivity are thus one and the same.40 It follows that no 
explanation of linguistic productivity is complete unless it also addresses imaginative 
productivity. Just as importantly, it follows that we must take seeing-as, that which spoken 
images make available, to be constitutive of the speaking being, since it is the range of modes of 
seeing-as available to us that shapes and determines the sort of being that we are.41 If so, in 
explaining spoken images, their genesis, and their consequences, we also, and thereby, explain 
deep facts about the constitution of speaking beings, that is, of our selves. 
Similarly, since it is speaking images that enable us to project and discover novel 
analogies in the realm of meaningfulness,42 and therefore new ways of being in the world, it is 
speaking images that reveal the essence of language at the very moment in which they force it to 
undergo change, at the moment when its semantic categories are put under pressure by the 
syntax.43 Once a new determination of the semantic categories has been reached, once the images 
have been seen, once they have become part of the things we say, a new language will be 
determined, since L-discourse is constituted by its semantic categories, by the ways in which its 
texts are structured and interpreted.44 Since applicability conditions for predicates determine 
modes of being, and since one cannot adopt incompatible ways of being, languages and modes of 
being are thus in a 1-1 correspondence.45 It follows that the universe of Ricœurian languages is 
splendidly plenitudinous. There are as many languages as there are speaking images. Syntactic 
pressure on the semantics will, in each case, give rise to a new language.46 
A rather pressing question now arises, one that Ricœur himself asked: “If an image is not 
derived from perception, how can it be derived from language?”47 My answer is simple: a 
spoken image is announced in language, precisely because it is spoken through it. I’ll say more 
about this simple answer in the concluding section. Here, I want to stress that spoken images are 
not just announced, but that they are also themselves announcers of something else, since, as 
we’ve just seen, spoken images are the epiphanies of yet to be disclosed meanings.48 In order to 
understand the phenomenon of spoken images, then, we must not just trace their origins, but 
their consequences too. In particular, we must investigate how spoken images are related to that 
other, and much more familiar, key Ricœurian notion, namely, metaphor. Much of what I said so 
far might have given the impression that I take spoken images to be metaphors. This is not so. 
Spoken images are not yet metaphors, precisely because they are neither seen nor said, but only 
about to be said (and seen). By contrast, metaphors, live metaphors, are not only images that have 
been said (and not just spoken); they are images that have also been seen. Let me turn, then, to a 
brief sketch of Ricœur’s celebrated conception of metaphor. 
3.2. Ricœur on Metaphor 
For Ricœur, metaphor, far from being a merely peripheral phenomenon, is in fact the 
central and philosophically most significant linguistic phenomenon, precisely because it is the 
point at which language opens up new semantic possibilities through the coming to salience of 
new similarities: 
 Speaking Images. Chomsky and Ricœur on Linguistic Creativity 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 8, No 1 (2017)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2017.370    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu  
90 
 
[H]ow do we make sense with nonsense? [...] The creative moment of metaphor is 
concentrated on [a] grasping of resemblances, in the perception of analogies. [...] In novel 
metaphors the similarity is itself the fruit of metaphor. [...] The visionary grasping of 
resemblance is at the same time a verbal invention.49 
The verbal invention of Ricœurian metaphor is a “semantic innovation” that triggers “an 
emergent meaning,” a “metamorphosis of both language and reality”;50 it is the dialectical locus 
for the “interplay between an anterior situation which appears suddenly undone” and the 
“strategy which reorganises the residues left over from the anterior structuration.”51 
In virtue of its heavy-duty restructuring tasks with respect to the profile of semantic 
categories, metaphor is thus not a merely “bizarre form of predication.”52 It is rather the place 
where the very idea of predication is questioned, reshaped, recalibrated, reinvented, the place, 
where the world of language qua potential discourse explodes that of actualised human 
discourse, where new meanings are generated and old ones are tweaked. 53 
Patently, on Ricœur’s view conceptual change is indivisible from discursive, purely 
verbal invention. Equally, the apparent, or temporary, misalignment between syntax and 
semantics (the fact that syntax has devised strings that challenge extant semantic categories) is 
what gives rise both to speaking images and to the attendant need for speakers to catch up and 
grasp the novel language that is being generated there and then by those epiphanic images that 
are heard while still unseen. As I already stressed, the generating powers of metaphor are not just 
episodic, since for Ricœur metaphor truly is “at the origin of all semantic fields,” it is the 
privileged locus-event for the unleashing of the unbounded “creative use of polysemy,” for the 
coming to semantic salience of the “possibilities of indefinite invention.”54 
With all of this in mind, we can now revisit our opening quote and say that speaking 
images show that “the ‘world’ of the text may explode the world of the author.”55 Language, that 
is, creates and occupies for us the as yet unreached there, the location in the space of 
meaningfulness that we shall eventually inhabit once the full power of the image spoken by the 
text has finally been seen, once the image has been said, once it has become a metaphor. 
The privileged meaning-creating role of metaphor can now be appreciated more fully. 
For while language in general contains and preserves “the signs of humanity” that are therein 
deposited, so that proper interpretation of extant texts is a matter of receiving from them an 
“enlarged self,”56 in the case of metaphor the broader self thus received is a wholly 
unprecedented self, a pristine disposition towards the world that language, all by itself, makes 
available to us through the syntactically-driven epiphany of speaking images. It then follows, 
given its status as the privileged producer of images, that metaphor must be taken to be the α ̓ρχή 
of successive L-discourses, as well as the archive, in Derrida’s sense,57 of past and future 
languages in the chain of ever-expanding discourses, the place where the order of words and of 
worlds is stored, where all possible structurings of semantic fields are encased. Indeed, metaphor 
and speaking images show the deep sense in which Ricœur’s claim that “a human being is 
fundamentally and in the first place a being ahead of itself” is true.58 It is language qua metaphor 
that takes our being ahead of itself, that represents its possibilities before we can occupy and 
embody them. And it is speaking images that provide guidance in that process of self-
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expansion.59 Or rather: speaking images merely present those possibilities, while metaphor 
genuinely represents them. 
If my gloss is correct, this is the full sense in which the text speaks those possibilities well 
before we can see that they are possibilities, and what kind of possibilities they actually are.60 
Ricœur’s version of the autonomy of syntax thesis, then, must be seen as a thesis concerning the 
epistemological priority of syntax over semantics. Syntax and semantics are, however, of a piece, 
metaphysically speaking. Ultimately, the space of meaningfulness is coextensive with the space 
of syntax.61 It is closed not just under the compositional operations, but under the syntactic 
operations too—as shown by the fact that spoken images are spoken, that they are always given 
linguistic shape. 
We have seen that metaphor forces our language to expand. I now want to propose that 
we take this idea seriously, that we take Ricœurian metaphor to constitute and inhabit the links in 
the chain of ever expanding languages.62 These links mark the nodes where new regions of 
meaningfulness are inscribed in and annexed to settled discourse. 
In characterising the peculiar semantic and meta-semantic status of Ricœurian metaphor 
in these terms I must now stress that Ricœur insists that L-discourse never loses sight of its 
referential function, that “there is no discourse so fictional that it does not connect up with 
reality.”63 Even when L-discourse appears to leave its referential duties behind, Ricœur argues 
that we enter a second-order of reference, an order that is in fact deeper than the everyday first-
order level of engagement with things.64 At the second-order level, language reflects on and 
probes its first-order level referential capacities. 
I think we should take Ricœur’s claim a step further and say that metaphor gives rise to a 
third-order level of reference, an order, or rather, the order that disciplines the possibilities of 
lower-level reference. Metaphor, that is, opens up new ways of referential engagement with the 
world, indeed, new ways of thinking of reference. This is so because metaphor has the “ability to 
engender conceptual diversity, [...] an unlimited number of potential interpretations.” Metaphor 
extends the ways words can be interpreted; it multiplies their ontological hooks onto objects in 
the world. And it is thanks to its power over concepts that metaphor can force us to “perceive 
new connections among things,”65 and that it can extend the network of referential relations 
between language and world, first through the medium of syntax, and then through a regrouping 
of the semantics. As for the relation between spoken images and metaphor, to repeat: in epistemic 
terms, spoken images precede metaphor, they precede the regrouping of the semantics, indeed, 
they precede the very idea that semantics could be regrouped.66 In speaking images, we 
contemplate the epiphany of the possibility of a new meaning. It is the task of metaphor to make 
that possibility fully salient, to make available to us the newly determined mode of seeing-as 
thereby determined. 
This, then, is Ricœur’s richly insightful conception of metaphor. I’m now going to argue, 
however, that a deep paradox lies at the very heart of that conception. 
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4. The Antinomy of Metaphor 
The burden of this section is to show that while metaphor may well be the home of 
language it is itself without a home in any language.67 It is Ricœur himself that tells us that 
metaphor is “a semantic innovation which has no status in an already established language.”68 
Metaphor, we’re told, “only exists in the moment of invention.” Before the invention, there is no 
new language yet. After the invention, the old language must be forgotten, since the removal of 
the semantic shock by the successful metaphor entails the erasure of the previous semantic 
categories. During the invention, neither language can exist (in the moment of invention the old 
and new categories are merged and therefore annihilated), but both languages must exist too (or 
else there would be nothing that is being merged)—e.g. for ‘time is a beggar’ to count as a 
metaphor, it must both be possible and impossible for highly abstract entities to go around 
begging, and speakers must be able to grasp both of these facts simultaneously.69 Metaphor must 
thus be able to see both new and settled semantic categories so as to trigger the conceptual 
tension that alone can produce the new semantic categories: 
It is essential to the structure of metaphor that the old and the new are present together in 
the metaphorical twist.70 
But those categories cannot obtain at one and the same time: 
[Metaphor] is a calculated error, which brings together things that do not go together.71 
And yet we must also be somehow able to simultaneously grasp incompatible semantic 
categories: 
When we receive a metaphorical statement as meaningful, we perceive both the literal 
meaning which is bound by the semantic incongruity and the new meaning which makes 
sense in the present context.72 
This alienated, institutionally fractured status of metaphor is indeed constitutive of its 
meaning-generating role. Metaphor can bring into being new ways of seeing reality only in the 
presence of a conceptual tension with respect to settled semantic categories.73 It is through that 
tension that metaphor distanciates the predicate from the subject.74 And it is through that tension 
that metaphor allows the “assimilation of hitherto separated semantic fields.”75 But it is also 
because of that tension that metaphor cannot be “fully integrated in a meaningful context” until 
new events enable the space of meaningfulness to readjust itself.76 As soon as those events occur, 
the newly created space of meaningfulness will have no space for the metaphor. A successful 
metaphor, that is, destroys its own grounds, since, as we saw already, by removing the semantic 
shock it also removes the old language, but in turn that shock constitutively depends on the 
existence of the very language that metaphor must instead destroy in order to come into being.77 
The antinomy of metaphor thus arises because if metaphor sits outside the old language, 
it cannot engender the required categorial clash. But if it sits inside the old language, it cannot see 
into the new language, for if it did, the categorial tension could not arise in the first place (it 
would already be defused). Conversely, if metaphor sits in the new language, the categorial 
Walter B. Pedriali 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     
Vol 8, No 1 (2017)    ISSN 2156-7808 (online)    DOI 10.5195/errs.2017.370    http://ricoeur.pitt.edu   
93 
 
tension is, necessarily, a forgotten one. Indeed, the tension has itself become unthinkable (as 
witnessed by the phenomenon of dead metaphors), with the memory of the semantic clash 
vanished beyond retrieval. 
In short, if the proper analysis of metaphor consists in an answer to the question of how 
metaphor can make sense out of nonsense, we need a language where one and the same 
meaning-combination is both sense and nonsense, where “sameness and difference are not 
merely mixed, but remain opposed,”78 a language where metaphor is both the enigma and the 
solution to the enigma.79 We need a language that “raises above itself.”80 But, it seems, there can 
be no such language.81 
I think this pushes us towards seeing metaphor as a kind of linguistic χώρα, an area 
outside the town of language, the non-home, or the borrowed home of meaningfulness, home to 
every language and at home in none, the anachrony of language where the narrative powers of 
language step outside time, where in an extremal form of Verfremdung, languages, and subjects, 
are placed outside themselves, observing their own laws and their reciprocal relations of 
expansion.82 
4.1. Metaphor as Deferance 
In the final section, I will come back to the idea of metaphor as the exiled origin of 
meaningfulness. To prepare the ground for that, I first want to propose that we take metaphor, 
and meaning more generally, to be deferance, a notion that, I think, is the proper and richer 
rendering of Derridean différance, incorporating not just cross-contextual difference and temporal 
deferral but also linguistic deference, in Putnam’s sense, that is, deference to the linguistic 
authority of the experts in one’s community, including one’s future, and more competent, 
selves.83 Deferance, that is, is meaning as standing deference to future uses of the word, to future 
linguistic norms, to future languages, to future modes of being.84 Deferance, and meaning, is thus 
différance plus normative deference in the just rehearsed sense.85 
Under this proposal, metaphor is the engine of meaningfulness, it is the in-between-
languages workshop where new semantic categories are first intuited and forged. And those 
categories and the subcategorization principles that they engender are adopted from a position of 
standing deference to the normative authority of future meaning-fixing expansions and to the 
agents thereby configured.86 The cost, it seems, is the antinomy of a linguistic device, metaphor, 
that cannot live in any language, a device that has to be deeply metalinguistic, or rather, supra-
linguistic, because it cannot inhabit any language at all, it can only “appear” to speakers in the 
fleeting moment in which they move from one L-discourse to another, it is a device that can only 
inhabit, ephemerally, a language-less dimension, the dimension in which speaking images reside. 
4.2. A Natural Response 
Before I put forward my own solution to the antinomy, let me briefly consider one fairly 
natural objection. The objection is that antinomies are to be embraced, not eliminated, that they 
are not symptoms of any sort of pathology but on the contrary a sign of robust, indeed perfectly 
rude health. We could, for instance, happily invoke, as Ricœur himself does, the usual Hegelian 
Aufhebung strategy and say that metaphor acts as the “suppression-preservation” of old and new 
semantic categories.87 Still along similar lines, we could also think, with Derrida this time, that 
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the inscription borne by metaphor is one that can succeed only by being effaced in the very act of 
inscription, that there can be a kind of contradictory coherence in the idea of a centre of 
meaningfulness that is not itself a centre, that, in short, what we really have here is a 
contradiction without contradiction.88 If we are impressed by these suggestions we might well 
think that a palimpsest model whereby we can grasp two languages or two reading-modes at 
once is neither inconceivable nor contradictory.89 
While I can certainly sympathise with the general thrust of this response, I do not think it 
gets us out of the woods just yet. The fact is, Ricœur himself tells us that metaphor “self-
destruct[s] in a significant contradiction.”90 And the point here is that the self-destruction is and 
must be transformation too. It is a self-destruction that must make room for a clash of 
interpretations grounded in two distinct, incompatible languages in order to achieve the required 
expansion of semantic categories. Without the distinctness of the two languages and their 
incompatibility, there can be no expansion. And surely, it is not just objects that are incompatible; 
event and processes can be so too.91 In particular, even if we think of concepts as event- like, as 
open-textured à la Waismann,92 we still face the same problem. The trouble is that on Ricœur’s 
account metaphor requires incompatible features of a concept-object pair or of a corresponding 
process to trigger the semantic shock. If we dilute away the incompatibility, we deprive 
metaphor of its constitutive force. Metaphor needs fixity of semantic categories to come into 
being. As soon as those categories are relaxed, metaphor, and the language determined by those 
categories, will disappear. But with that non-renounceable tension on board, metaphor 
immediately becomes homeless, since there cannot be a language that is simultaneously 
enforcing contradictory semantic categories or an event that subsumes and absorbs contradictory 
events.93 
A final point of dissatisfaction with this line of response is that we are under a theoretical 
need to understand, and not just to describe, how this elusive link across distinct languages and 
reading-modes actually works. What we want, that is, is an explanation of what is going on with 
metaphor.94 Appeal to “dynamic objects” or to processes provides no satisfactory theoretical 
explanation, unless we get a detailed story about how the transition we are trying to understand 
actually works.95 Quietist responses of the sort just sketched would at best provide a mere 
description of the surface events without giving any insight into the workings of language and 
thought at their most excitingly creative. 
In the next section I want to sketch the outlines of a story about the ways in which 
metaphor and syntax interact. 
5. Solving the Antinomy 
Language takes precedence. Not only before meaning. Also before the self. 
Walter Benjamin96 
What, then, is linguistic creativity? What are the specific conditions under which 
something new is produced sub specie metaphorae? Our problem was that in the moment in which 
metaphor projects our understanding forward, in the moment in which we are divining the new 
meaning, we are necessarily trapped within the link joining one language to another. When we 
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inhabit the link, we are no longer in the old language, and not yet in the new one. We are outside 
the chain, indeed, outside all chains, and hence we are not in a determinate mode of being. 
However, grasping a text, making sense of and with nonsense, is necessarily an activity that is 
always situated, always grounded in a specific mode of understanding: 
Understanding is not concerned with grasping a fact but with apprehending a possibility 
of being. [...] To understand a text [...] is not to find a lifeless sense that is contained 
therein, but to unfold the possibility of being indicated by the text.97 
Understanding is a projection of being, and Ricœur is quite sensitive to the conceptual 
dangers here, since he grants that we speak “paradoxically” if we take, as we must, that 
projection to be taking place “within a prior being-thrown.” The projector, that is, must already 
be in the projected space while also still occupying the projecting location. Hence, the subject 
(and the language) are both the source and the target of the projecting act. 
The Ricœurian conception of linguistic creativity thus requires the persistence of that 
which it destroys in the very act of metamorphosis. Clearly, the problem we need to address 
concerns the conceptual coherence of the privileged epistemic space from which the projection to 
new modes of being is effected, a space that lives, as it were, between the ruins of language.98 
Otherwise put: 
[T]he essential question is not to recover, behind the text, the lost intention, but to unfold, 
in front of the text, the ‘world’ it opens up and discloses.99 
But what mode of being could possibly place us in front of the text if metaphor 
constitutively shatters language, if, in the moment when metaphor is genuinely present to us, we 
have neither language nor mode of being available to us to provide a vantage point from which 
to observe the emergence of the new meaning that will eventually reduce “the shock engendered 
by two incompatible ideas”?100 
It seems to me that Ricœur faces a hard dilemma here. For either he gives up his 
distinctive claim that language creates worlds, modes of being, horizons, or he gives up his 
theory of metaphor which requires (temporarily) fixed categories to give rise to semantic shock 
and to the temporary irruption of nonsense into our language. Neither horn seems desirable, but 
neither horn seems avoidable either.101 Metaphor, Ricœur tells us, is not polysemy.102 In other 
words: it is not a palimpsest. But if so, it is then unclear a) how Ricœur can go on to saying that in 
metaphorical statements “‘same’ and ‘different’ are not just mixed together, they also remain 
opposed,”103 since that would grant that metaphor is polysemy after all, and b) whether Ricœur 
can still insist that L-discourse discloses and determines specific ways of being. Surely, the 
(Ricœurian) move “from text to action” holds for metaphor if it holds anywhere: and how, then, 
could we simultaneously act from within two contradictory modes of being? Surely, linguistic 
category mistakes do not have executable counterparts in the realm of action. 
Ironically, the problem for Ricœur stems from his highly dynamic conception of 
language, from his insistence that language cannot ever be treated as a fixed, closed L-system. 
Without a closed L-system to act on, however, metaphor loses its meaning-generating powers. 
The crucial point here is that although metaphor maps to an unlimited number of possibilities, 
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the mapping is normatively constrained (not just any old possibility will do). What we are after, 
then, is a conception of metaphor that allows us to capture the idea that the acts of deferance that 
structure the chain of languages are “neither fallen from the sky nor inscribed once and for all in 
a closed system,”104 that they are neither arbitrary, nor fixed by an artificially regimented L-
system. The question, that is, is whether we could find a space between metaphor and nonsense, 
a space where the normatively constrained emergence of new domains of meaningfulness can 
coherently be apprehended and described. Otherwise put, the question before us is: what are the 
rules of metaphor that are in force during the operations of live metaphor? 
I think we have no option here but to take metaphor to be a supra-linguistic act. 
Metaphor is an act of inscription on a language but it is not an act carried out from within any 
language properly so called. It is, rather, a supralinguistic event taking place within something 
which is not a language, but only a proper part of one, just as Ricœur himself suggests.105 When 
we confront metaphor, we are forced to exit our language, we are in effect doing metatheory, or 
rather, supra-theory, we are suspended between languages, we are extraordinary agents, because 
speaking images force us to be extraordinary speakers, speakers of a language that does not 
determine a mode of being, not a sublunary at least. 
This is, I think, fully in line with Ricœur’s notion of the ontological vehemence of 
metaphor.106 Metaphor determines what there is, what objects are recognised as being part of the 
domain, what predicates they can fall under; it determines the boundary of the nameable within 
that language. It thus sets the ontology underlying the language and thereby determines what 
kind of agent the language configures. We could say, as Ricœur does, that metaphor belongs to 
discourse.107 But if it does, it belongs to a very special kind of discourse, a meta-discourse that 
regulates the chain of languages, a discourse where language is maximally reflective.108 
However, that privileged kind of discourse is not, contra Ricœur, “installed in being.”109 It is, 
rather, a discourse which is autonomous with respect to being. It is, in fact, a discourse that, truly, 
installs being, in that it is the discourse that evaluates the ontological categories through which 
we see the world.110 
The way out of the dilemma, then, is simply to grant metaphorical discourse autonomy 
from specific forms of being. And this is the sense in which Chomsky was right.111 The language 
faculty does indeed output highly abstract representations. But that doesn’t mean that the 
representations are abstract in the sense of being altogether devoid of referential powers (as we 
saw, a most un-Ricœurian thought), or that syntax is autonomous with respect to semantics but a 
slave to conceptual structure.112 Rather, the abstract quality of language in its metaphorical mode 
derives from the fact that language in general configures ways of being in the world that are both 
highly specific and highly abstract. They are highly specific because they delineate precise 
agential attitudes. But they are also highly abstract because they go beyond the singularities of 
particularised embeddings—they merely delineate, just as Ricœur says, “the free play of 
possibilities,” not of actualities.113 
Patently, actualisation requires embedment in a specific environment. And the marvel of 
metaphor consists precisely in its ability to temporarily remove us from our particular 
embedment, in its ability to show the capacity of language to root and uproot itself from 
singularities.114 The metaphor-determined ways of being are thus, when they first appear, 
appropriately schematic, but, for all their schematicity, they do not cease to be modes of being. 
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It’s just that, when images speak, the contribution from the embedding environment is 
suspended, bracketed away.115 That suspension, in fact, is the only way in which those images 
can eventually become visible. But it is a suspension only in the sense in which a schema 
suspends the referential powers of its instances. As Ricœur tells us, “treated as a schema, the 
image presents a verbal dimension, [...] the gathering point [...] of emerging meanings.”116 This is 
the sense in which metaphor, qua seen image, is but a “redefining of what is already defined, a 
reinterpretation of what is already interpreted.”117 
The reflective ascent that metaphor forces on us, then, is not, contra Ricœur, a way of 
“locking language up inside itself.”118 Rather, it is a way of opening up a language to the chain of 
languages of which it is part by temporarily suspending the contribution from the environment 
(rather than the referential connections to it). The temporary suspension of that external 
contribution is achieved by retreating to the logical fragment of the language, a fragment that is 
insensitive to any external contribution, a fragment where syntax has become abstractly bare, 
merely mapping ranges of unactualised meaning-possibilities. From that retreat, one can safely 
evaluate and indeed appreciate the competing semantic categories that determine the individual 
L-discourses that form the chain. 
There is then a further sense in which syntax is autonomous.119 The syntax that generates 
reflective discourse is autonomous with respect to the syntax that generates fully engaged 
discourse. In this reflective role, language, thus generated, is none other than what Ricœur so 
happily called “langage en fête,”120 a language that, unlike Wittgenstein’s, is not on holiday from 
its daily duties and thereby blunted in its communicative powers.121 On the contrary, it is a 
maximally communicative language, a language in celebration, in self-celebration, in fact.122 And 
it is the very disengagement from a specific being-determining function that grants it the 
transversal sight able to survey the entire space of meaningfulness.123 
Accordingly, it is syntax in its trans-semantic role that rubs language down to its 
minimal, normatively-constrained logical core, that lets us hear “the primitive rumbles of logic,” 
as Mallarmé so aptly put it. And it is “the distant stammering” of the bare, abandoned words, in 
their trans-referential state of suspension, of words that “light each other up all by themselves,” 
that constitutes the genuine autonomous state of syntax.124 
This “irreducible excess of syntax,”125 however, is not an excess of abstraction, of 
extremal non-referentiality, as Chomsky would have it. It is, rather, a genuinely pre- and para-
semantic excess, it is an excess of in nuce signification. The barer the syntax, the more exuberant 
the semantic possibilities that it raises to salience, that is. 
All that needs saying to resolve the antinomy of metaphor, then, is that language-qua-
bare-syntax discloses conceptual space while remaining autonomous with respect to conceptual 
structure because what syntax maps are the possibilities determined by indefinitely many 
conceptual structures, because syntax is the archive of meaning that stands before the 
(deferential) archivist.126 And the unrehearsed steps that we, qua archivists of meaning, take into 
the yet-to-be-normalised space of meaningfulness are, one and all, taken in the reflective space 
between nonsense and metaphor where unseen images speak, a space that has been opened up 
for us by Ricœur, and by no other thinker.127 
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15 Chomsky, Linguistic Theory, 147. See Juan Uriagereka, Syntactic Anchors. On Semantic Structuring 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), § 2.4, for a recent discussion. Chomsky makes clear 
that the core of the autonomy thesis is that “the mechanisms of syntax [...] function independently of 
the other components of the grammar, which are interpretive components,” Language and 
Responsibility (New York: The New Press, 1979), 138-145. I largely accept this claim. My gripe is with 
Chomsky’s further claim that it is syntax that fixes subcategorization principles. In § 5, I return to 
Chomsky’s other, non-equivalent statement of the autonomy thesis that “the language faculty 
constructs an abstract formal skeleton invested with meaning by interpretive rules,” Reflections, 55. 
16 Chomsky, Linguistic Theory, ch. V. 
17 Chomsky, Aspects, 78, 120, 149. 
18 Chomsky, Aspects, 78; Syntactic Structures, 15. In Language and Problems of Knowledge. The 
Managua Lectures (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988), 24-26, however, Chomsky criticises uses 
of analogy in linguistic theory. 
19 Chomsky, Linguistic Theory, 146. 
20 Chomsky oscillates between saying that concepts are “available before experience with language,” 
Language and Problems, 28, and that concepts “change constantly as the theoretical matrix change,” 
Language and Responsibility, 171. In general, however, Chomsky thinks that “variability of semantic 
fields” (i.e. of conceptual structure) belongs to matters that are “computationally irrelevant,” “Bare 
Phrase Structure,” 389.  
21 According to the OED, one of the earliest such uses is due to Burke in 1796 but the ‘revolutionary ideas’ 
pairing is first due to G.B. Shaw in 1919. Tracing earliest occurrences of a particular usage is a 
dangerous game to play, but all I need is the undoubted gap between the astronomical use and its 
(mis-)application to abstract ideas (and similarly for ‘appear’). For early examples of the “abstract” 
use of ‘revolutionary’, see Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983). 
22 The point generalises to other cases discussed by Chomsky such as ‘Sincerity admires John’ and ‘Golf 
plays John’, Aspects, 149. Both sentences can easily be given not just interpretations (Chomsky 
countenanced that circumstance) but can also be taken to be part of “normal” English given enough 
currency within a specific conceptual scheme. The Medieval anthropomorphisation of virtues made 
Sincerity a perfectly suitable entity to figure as the subject of a verb such as ‘admire’; an admiring 
“new-age” coach may well confide to a friend that John is not just very good at golf, he’s become so 
good that golf plays John and not vice-versa. These cases seem to me perfectly good, and open to 
immediate acceptance by speakers familiar with their changed grammatical status. In this respect, 
the discussion of the history of the ‘seeing-is-knowing’ metaphor in George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, 
Philosophy in the Flesh. The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought (New York: Basic 
Books, 1999), 85, is illuminating. 
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23 Chomsky, Current Issues, 112. 
24 This Hume-inspired claim is in Language and Problems, 28, 32, 34. In Aspects, 160, Current Issues, 60, 
fn. 1, Language and Mind, 106-110, Chomsky states that we need “language-independent constraints 
on semantic features” drawn from the “system of possible concepts.” In Cartesian Linguistics, 76, he 
takes the “limitless possibilities of thought and imagination” to be reflected “in the creative aspects of 
language use.” This suggests a certain indecision regarding the question at the centre of this paper. Is 
our conceptual system fixed by the hand of nature or limitless, according to Chomsky? I’m not sure 
there’s a stable answer to be evinced from his work. 
25 Chomsky, Language and Problems, 31. 
26 Chomsky, Language and Problems, 32. 
27 Juan Uriagereka, Derivations. Exploring the Dynamics of Syntax (London: Routledge, 2002); Chomsky, 
Language and Mind, 15. 
28 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory. Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, TX: TCU Press, 
1976), 2. 
29 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 27. By contrast, Chomsky tells us that “grammars have [...] real 
existence, [...] there is something in your brain that corresponds to the grammar [...] there is nothing 
in the real world corresponding to language [qua Ricœurian L-discourse],” The Generative Enterprise 
(Dordrecht: Foris Publications, 1982), 107. 
30 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 87-88. 
31 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation,” in Hermeneutics & the Human Sciences 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 143; Interpretation Theory, 36-37, 60, 68, 87-88; 
“Existence and Hermeneutics,” in The Conflict of Interpretations (London: Continuum, 1989), 11; 
“The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology,” in Conflict of Interpretations, 258; “Myth 
as the Bearer of Possible Worlds,” in Richard Kearney, On Paul Ricœur. The Owl of Minerva (New 
York: Fordham Press, 2004), 124-125. Note that L-discourse is a collection of texts, where the notion 
of text also includes speech acts of various kinds. To be master of a language is to be able to 
understand its texts.  
32 Ricœur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics, vol. 2 of Writing and 
Lectures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 64. 
33 Chomsky does not agree that communication is the basic function of language, nor that language has 
any central function at all. See “Explaining Language Use,” Philosophical Topics 20 (1992): 215; Rules 
and Representations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 230. He would thus not accept the 
claim in the text either. Moreover, it seems likely that Chomsky would find Ricœur’s externalist notion 
of L-discourse “highly problematic and unintelligible.” The fact remains that his own strictly internalist 
account of language makes no room for a proper account of linguistic creativity and language change.  
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34 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel (Oxford: Blackwell, 1967), § 234. 
35 The terminology comes from Marcus Hester. See Ricœur, “The Function of Fiction in Shaping Reality,” 
Man and World 12 (1979): 133; “The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination, and Feeling,” 
Critical Inquiry 5 (1979), 150; The Rule of Metaphor (London and New York: Routledge, 1977), 250. 
The Bachelard-inspired notion of spoken image has received relatively little critical attention (an 
exception is George Taylor, “The Phenomenological Contributions of Ricœur’s Philosophy of 
Imagination,” Social Imaginaries 1 (2015)). It is however an absolutely central and recurring feature 
of Ricœur’s conception of language. See e.g. “The Symbol Gives Rise to Thought,” in Philosophical 
Anthropology, vol. 3 of Writing and Lectures (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), 110; Freud and 
Philosophy. An Essay on Interpretation (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2008), 15-16; Rule of 
Metaphor, 235; “Imagination in Discourse,” 167, 170; “Image and Language,” 108; “Function of 
Fiction,” 129, 132, 134. 
36 “Function of Fiction,” 127. 
37 Ricœur, “The Creativity of Language,” in Kearney, On Paul Ricœur, 134. 
38 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 117. A spoken 
image is thus a not-yet successful speech-act, an act without uptake, an act that, like the text, 
“interprets before having been interpreted,” Ricœur, Figuring the Sacred. Religion, Narrative, and 
Imagination (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1995), 161. A seeing-as is instead a full-blooded act. 
See Rule of Metaphor, 252. Proper sayings (proper conveyances of seeing-as modes), inasmuch as 
they are acts, in turn structure and connect our actions. See History and Truth (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), 204. Rather curiously, in Freud, 27, Ricœur seems to take the 
said as prior to the spoken (the contrast is that between parler and dire). I think it’s more accurate to 
instead take an act of saying to be an act in which a propositional content has been actually passed 
on from speaker to hearer. By contrast, I can speak without saying anything (without any transfer of 
information). Any time I say something, however, I may properly be said to have spoken. 
39 If you think the conceptual and the propositional are not co-extensive, you may deny that seeing-as 
requires grasp of a proposition. In that case, uptake will only require grasp of a concept. 
40 In “Function of Fiction,” 127, Ricœur is more cautious: “The “productive” aspects of imagination [...] 
appear to be linked to some “productive” aspects of language.” It seems to me, however, that Ricœur 
has established more than a mere link. I would therefore insist on a bold identity claim: imaginative 
productivity just is linguistic productivity. For a contrary reading, see Saulius Geniusas, “Between 
Phenomenology and Hermeneutics: Paul Ricœur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” Humanities Studies 38 
(2015), 232-235. Ricœur is however unequivocal: “we see images only insofar as we first hear them,” 
“Imagination in Discourse,” 170, my emphasis. Epistemologically, then, linguistic imagination 
necessarily precedes visual imagination. Metaphysically speaking, they are instead on a par. 
41 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 254. 
 
 
Walter B. Pedriali 
 
 
Études Ricœuriennes / Ricœur Studies     





42 Ricœur, “Creativity in Language. Word, Polysemy, Metaphor,” Philosophy Today 17 (1973), 107-108. 
43 I take it that Heidegger’s remark, in On the Way to Language (New York: HarperOne, 1971), 59, that 
the essence of language is revealed when it fails us (when words fail us), and Barthes’s technical 
notion of stammering, in The Rustle of Language (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1984), 78, aim to capture, mutatis mutandis, the same phenomenon I’m focusing on in this 
paper, the moment when language stops us, and itself, in our tracks. 
44 Here I am taking the notion of language change rather strictly. The notion can either be taken to refer 
to changes within a language or to changes that give rise to new languages. I read it in the latter 
way. For some contrasting approaches on this issue, see Ian Roberts and Anna Roussou, Syntactic 
Change. A Minimalist Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Laurel Brinton and 
Elizabeth Traugott, Lexicalization and Language Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2005); Elizabeth Traugott and Richard Dasher Regularity in Semantic Change (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), Regine Eckardt, Meaning Change in Grammaticalization. An Enquiry into 
Semantic Reanalysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
45 Thus, if we identified language with L-system, we would in fact destroy what is essential to language, 
since the event-like, agent-perspective-generating constitutive features of language do not survive 
their presumed hypostatisation into a formal object that abstracts away from precisely those features. 
See Ricœur, “Structure, Word, Event,” in Conflict of Interpretations, 82-83. 
46 Speakers who do not share the same mode of being, speakers who do not speak the same language, 
will communicate with each other as long as the two languages have sufficient overlap. 
47 Ricœur, “Imagination in Discourse,” 121. 
48 The announced/announcer duality explains the spoken/speaking duality with respect to images. 
49 Ricœur, “Creativity in Language,” 107. 
50 Ricœur, “Creativity in Language,” 111. 
51 Ricœur, “Hermeneutical Function,” 137. 
52 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 69. 
53 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 52; “Creativity in Language,” 109; “Hermeneutical Function,” 139. 
54 Ricœur, “Creativity in Language,” 107-109. 
55 Ricœur, “Hermeneutical Function,” 139. 
56 Ricœur, “Hermeneutical Function,” 143. 
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58 Ricœur, “Narrative: Its Place in Psychoanalysis,” in On Psychoanalysis, 209. The claim is of course 
already in Heidegger, e.g. Being and Time (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010). But 
the linguistic, text-based aspects of this claim are not as salient in Heidegger as they are in Ricœur. 
On this point, see Ricœur, “Philosophy and Religious Language,” in Figuring the Sacred, 43. 
59 In at least two senses of ‘self’! 
60 “Creativity in Language,” 107; Interpretation Theory, 36. 
61 Note that, as an anonymous referee for this journal pointed out, Ricœur’s notion of compositionality is 
holistic, since for him the meaning of a sentence (and therefore of a text) is determined by factors 
other than its immediate constituent meanings. See for example Ricœur, “Religious Language,” 38: “a 
text is always something more than the summation of its partial meanings.” The main point I’m 
making still holds, however. Syntax never outruns interpretation. 
62 On the link-status of metaphor, the discussion in Derrida, “The Retrait of Metaphor,” in Psyche. 
Inventions of the Other. Volume I (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 65, is quite 
relevant. For his part, Ricœur is clearly committed to the unbound nature of the expansion: 
“Discourse is this power of indefinitely extending the battlefront of the expressed at the expense of 
the unexpressed,” “Creativity in Language,” 100; “A significant trait of living language [...] is the 
power always to push the frontier or non-sense further back. [...] the power to create new contextual 
meanings seems to be truly limitless,” Rule of Metaphor, 111. 
63 Ricœur, “Hermeneutical Function,” 141. 
64 Ricœur, “Imagination in Discourse,” 170. 
65 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 64, 67. 
66 By contrast, from an ontological point of view, speaking images are indistinguishable from metaphors. 
We could also say that with spoken images there is a thought that has been interiorised but not yet 
recognised as the thought it is. To adapt Ricœur, “Metaphorical Process,” 156, it has merely been felt. 
In this regard, speaking images precede the three steps in the philosophy of imagination discussed in 
Ricœur, “Metaphorical Process,” 147. They are, in fact, the prelude to imagination. 
67 Ricœur, “Function of Fiction,” 131, briefly discusses the antinomy and labels it as such. He doesn’t 
press the point as far as he should have, though. 
68 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 52, 63-64. 
69 Note that the speaking image ‘time is a beggar’ just is the minimal proposition homophonically 
expressed by the sentence. The corresponding live metaphor provides a way to really see time as a 
beggar. Both the speaking image and the live metaphor express a multitude of propositions, exactly 
as per e.g. the speech-act pluralism in Herman Cappelen and Ernest Lepore, Insensitive Semantics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2005). A conventionalised metaphor has selected one particular proposition as its 
settled meaning. A dead metaphor has forgotten that it ever was an image, either spoken or seen. 
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70 Ricœur, “The Task of Hermeneutics,” in From Text to Action, 110. 
71 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 51. Ricœur, “Function of Fiction,” 131, seems to embrace the 
“paradoxical character” of metaphor, claiming that the “previous incompatibility” survives “through 
the new compatibility,” and that this survival gives rise to a “new sort of tension.” In my view, talk of 
survival is a mistake. 
72 Ricœur, “Task of Hermeneutics,” 110. 
73 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 68. 
74 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 56. 
75 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 57. 
76 Ricœur, “The Question of Proof in Freud’s Psychoanalytic Writings,” in On Psychoanalysis, 21. 
77 As Ricœur puts it, metaphor “abolishes the logical distance between previously remote semantic fields,” 
“Function of Fiction,” 130, my emphases. As soon as it does so, however, it also ceases to be live. 
Actually, here Ricœur misspeaks, because if metaphor abolished that distance, then the semantic 
clash wouldn’t arise. 
78 Ricœur, “Creativity in Language,” 108. 
79 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 254. 
80 Ricœur, “Central Problem,” 64. In short, the antinomy arises because of “the conflict between 
“proximity” and “distance” ,” Ricœur, “Function of Fiction,” 131. 
81 In saying this, I’m denying that we can make proper sense of the idea that “[r]estructuring [...] does 
not eliminate the previous categorization, but rather holds it in tension with a new categorization” 
suggested in Leonard Lawlor, Imagination and Chance. The Difference Between the Thought of Ricœur 
and Derrida (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1992), 67. This idea requires that, per 
impossibile, we grasp and implement in one and the same act the duck/rabbit Gestalt-switch between 
the two contradictory categorization principles. 
82 I borrow the very apt ‘borrowed home’ label from Du Marsais via Derrida, Retrait, 61, and the 
anachrony label from Derrida, On the Name (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 94. àą 
83 Hilary Putnam, “The Meaning of Meaning,” in Mathematics, Matter and Method. Philosophical Papers, 
Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 227-228. 
84 Deferance is a future perfect notion of the sort discussed in Derrida, “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” 
in Psyche. Vol. II (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987), 150, and in Alain Badiou’s notion of 
the event, Being and Event (London: Bloomsbury, 2005). 
85 I formulated this notion before coming across the insightful discussion in Thomas Baldwin, “Death and 
Meaning—Some Questions for Derrida,” in Arguing with Derrida, ed. Simon Glendinning (Oxford: 
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Blackwell, 2001), where the notion of deferance is briefly proposed in exactly the terms I’d developed 
independently. 
86 For simplicity’s sake, I’m here assuming that meaning always expands and never contracts, that 
successive languages in the chain enlarge, rather than restrict, the semantic fields. 
87 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 345. 
88 Derrida, Retrait, 75. I’m also adapting suggestions from Derrida, “Structure, Sign and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences,” in Dissemination (London: Continuum, 1981), 352, and 
“Semiology and Grammatology,” in Positions (London: Continuum, 1981), 24. Lawlor, Imagination 
and Chance, 16, glosses the close of Speech and Phenomena as defending the idea that in every use 
of language one in fact produces a new language while still being able to understand the previous 
one. 
89 In this regard, Derrida, “Form and Meaning. A Note on the Phenomenology of Language,” in Margins of 
Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), is highly relevant. 
90 Ricœur, Interpretation Theory, 50. 
91 Here one might again appeal to Wittgenstein’s duck/rabbit situation and take the two incompatible 
semantic categories as superimposed. After all, Ricœur himself, “Function of Fiction,” 131, spoke of 
metaphor as “a pertinence within impertinence.” Two remarks: it is impossible to grasp both figures 
at once; secondly, as reported in Taylor, “Ricœur’s Philosophy of Imagination,” Journal of French 
Philosophy 16 (2006), 95-96, Ricœur discussed the situation in his unpublished Lectures on 
Imagination and dismissed it as a case of purely reproductive, rather than productive imagination. 
92 Friedrich Waismann, “Verifiability,” in Logic and Language, ed. Anthony Flew (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), 
119-123. 
93 Ricœur, Time and Narrative. Volume III (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 
220, insists that the tension is constitutive of these phenomena. I agree. But the difficulty is that the 
relata to which the tension applies cannot come into being within the framework that Ricœur has 
sketched. I’m trying to set this right in the next section 
94 Ricœur himself is very clear on this: “the decisive problem [...] is the transition from literal 
incongruence to metaphorical congruence between two semantic fields,” “Metaphorical Process,” 147. 
Dabney Townsend, “Metaphor, Hermeneutics, and Situations,” in The Philosophy of Paul Ricœur, ed. 
Lewis Hahn (Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1995), 197, complains that Ricœur does not 
specify the mechanisms whereby metaphor achieves its semantic aims. My concern is instead 
whether, given Ricœur’s account, metaphor can even make a start on its task of recalibrating the 
semantic fields of a given language. 
95 We could insist that all modes of being are indeterminate, fluid, intrinsically dynamic. The problem, as I 
stress in the text, is that metaphor requires fixity of categories (and thereby of modes of being) in 
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order to create the semantic shock. I’m grateful to Todd Mei for urging me to address this objection to 
my account. 
96 Walter Benjamin, “Surrealism,” in Reflections, Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings (New York: 
Shocken Books, 1978), 179. 
97 Ricœur, “Tasks of Hermeneutics,” 64. Here and elsewhere (e.g. “Religious Language,” 43), Ricœur 
explicitly traces this conception of projection back to Heidegger. For his part, e.g. “Letter on 
“Humanism” ,” in Pathmarks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 269, Heidegger is quite 
clear that language provides our ἠ ͂θος, our abode, the constituting space of our identity. 
98 I borrow the ruins metaphor from Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 233; “Imagination in Discourse,” 168; 
“Metaphorical Process,” 153; “Function of Fiction,” 130; “On Interpretation,” in From Text to Action, 9. 
99 Ricœur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics,” in From Text to Action, 33, my emphasis. 
100 Ricœur, “Task of Hermeneutics,” 111; Interpretation Theory, 51. 
101 In Time and Narrative III, 220, Ricœur examines a similar dilemma at the heart of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, that of having to choose between “uncrossable distance or annulled distance.” If I’m 
right, the dilemma Ricœur confronts is one whereby it doesn’t even make sense to speak of distance 
because we cannot determine what the relata of that relation are. 
102 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 200. 
103 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 232. 
104 Derrida, “Semiology,” 24. 
105 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 359. 
106 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 354. 
107 Ricœur, “Task of Hermeneutics,” 109. 
108 Fully in line with the remark in Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 359, that language “possesses the reflective 
capacity to place itself at a distance and to consider itself.” In this section, I try to spell out exactly 
what that capacity consists in. 
109 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 359. 
110 To adapt Derrida, Retrait, 55, we could say that metaphor is not a transfer from the sensible to the 
intelligible but from one form of intelligibility to another. 
111 Chomsky, Reflections, 43. 
112 In this last respect, Chomsky’s autonomy thesis hadn’t gone far enough. To be clear about this: 
Chomsky, Reflections, 138-139, is right to say that we could not learn “disembodied meaning[s],” 
meanings not embedded in any language. But that syntax is the home of meaning, of productively 
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conceived spoken images does not however entail that syntactic form is “established on 
[semantically] independent grounds” or that “the elements of syntax are not established on a 
semantics basis.” It is precisely the highly general representational richness of syntax that makes it 
semantically grounded. Chomsky, I think, confuses ontological and epistemological issues here. 
Syntax is epistemically prior, but ontologically speaking it already contains all semantic interpretations 
of its strings. And it is those interpretations that give syntax its specific structure. Clearly, this way of 
putting things neatly mirrors Ricœur’s claim that L-discourse has priority over L-system. 
113 Ricœur, “Imagination in Discourse,” 170. 
114 This, I think, is the sense in which Ricœur, “Metaphorical Process,” 153-154, speaks of referential 
suspension in metaphor. 
115 That is exactly the sense in which “icon is to language what schema is to concept,” Ricœur, “Function 
of Fiction,” 132. And this is also the sense in which the Kantian streak in Ricœur comes to the surface 
here: in spoken images, as in reflective judgement, it is epistemically indeterminate which concept is 
being deployed. 
116 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 235. 
117 Ricœur, “Creativity of Language,” 133. 
118 Ricœur, Rule of Metaphor, 360. 
119 Note that the sense of syntax involved here goes even wider than Chomsky’s already comprehensive 
sense, since Ricoeurian syntax is also a text-generating device. 
120 Ricœur, “Structure, Word,” 93. 
121 Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), § 38, § 194. 
122 As Ricœur, “Metaphorical Process,” 153, makes clear, by celebrating itself, language celebrates the 
world and, most importantly, the subject, the discerner of possibilities.ā 
123 Is there a “revenge” paradox lurking in the vicinity? Isn’t the metaphorical mode of being a mode of 
being nevertheless and thus in tension with the non-specificity of metaphor? I don’t think so, because 
we are using the minimal, invariant core of language as a mirror through which to contemplate the 
metaphorical mode. That core, precisely because of its disconnection from a specific embedment, is 
no more than a supra-mode of being. Its ontological clutch is not fully engaged, that is. 
124 Stephan Mallarmé, “The Mystery of Letters” from Divagations. See Derrida, “The Double Session,” in 
Dissemination, 194, for a brilliant discussion. Of note here is Mallarmé’s insistence that his work was 
that of a scrupulous “syntaxer,” unravelling content that was already there, in the very shape and 
placement of his sentences. 
125 Derrida, “Double Session,” 230. 
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126 In all senses of ‘before’. 
127 In his eulogy of Artaud, Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997), got very close but not, I think, as close as Ricœur did to the heart of the 
matter. Somehow, the best way for me to make sense of the proper role of metaphor and of speaking 
images is to recall something that Wayne Shorter once said: “The six years I was with Miles [Davis], 
we never had a rehearsal. How do you rehearse the unknown?.” Quite. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Society for European Philosophy New Frontiers 
conference, University of Dundee, 3 September 2015. Many thanks to the audience on that occasion 
for useful feedback, in particular to Lisa Foran. Additional thanks are due to Todd Mei and two 
referees for this journal for very insightful comments. 
